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As political polarization in the United States continues to rise 1–3, the question of whether
polarized individuals can fruitfully cooperate becomes pressing. Although diverse perspec-
tives typically lead to superior team performance on complex tasks 4, 5, strong political per-
spectives have been associated with conflict, misinformation and a reluctance to engage with
people and ideas beyond one’s echo chamber 6–8. Here, we explore the effect of ideological
composition on team performance through analyzing millions of edits to Wikipedia’s Polit-
ical, Social Issues, and Science articles. We measure editors’ online ideological preferences
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by how much they contribute to conservative versus liberal articles. Editor surveys suggest
that online contributions associate with offline (a) political party affiliation and (b) ideological
self-identity. Our analysis reveals that polarized teams consisting of a balanced set of ideolog-
ically diverse editors produce articles of higher quality than homogeneous teams. The effect
appears most strongly in Wikipedia’s Political articles, but also in Social Issues and even
Science articles. Analysis of article “talk pages” reveals that ideologically polarized teams
engage in longer, more constructive, competitive, and substantively focused but linguistically
diverse debates than ideological moderates. More intense use of Wikipedia policies by ideo-
logically diverse teams suggests institutional design principles to help unleash the power of
polarization.
Recent political events, including the 2016 presidential election, have underscored growing
political divisions in American society. Political speech has become markedly more polarized in
recent years 1, tracing a growing divergence between platforms of the major political parties 2 and
leading to a state of political hyper-partisanship 3. Yet the effects of political difference are not
confined to the domain of politics alone. A growing literature documents how individual political
alignments shape personal consumption of ostensibly non-political products, news, and cultural
and scientific information 9–13. This literature has converged on an alarming narrative: despite
early promise of the world-wide-web to democratize access to diverse information 14, increased
media choice and social networking platforms have led to the converse. Collaborative filtering
allows individuals to passively enter “echo chambers” that limit the variety of information they
observe and trust 15–17. These can degrade the quality of individual decisions, including those that
undergird basic democratic institutions 6–8. Psychological mechanisms such as motivated reasoning
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18, 19 and a tendency to discount identity-incongruent opinions 7, 20 stimulate and reinforce polarizing
information. Opposing social identities can foment conflict and even make communication counter-
productive 21.
Nevertheless, a large literature documents the largely positive effect that social differences
can exert on the collaborative production of information, goods, and services 4, 5. Research demon-
strates that individuals from socially distinct groups embody diverse cognitive resources and per-
spectives that, when cooperatively combined in complex or creative tasks produce ideas, solutions,
and designs that outperform those from homogeneous groups 22–25. Collaborations between in-
ventors from distinct social groups result in more creative patents 26, scientific teams representing
distinct disciplines produce more highly cited papers 27, and gender diversity broadens the ques-
tions scientists ask 29.
The effect of political diversity on the collective production of knowledge, however, remains
unclear. Insights from cognitive diversity research suggest that political diversity, like other forms
of diversity, should positively impact the quality of group production because different perspectives,
in the words of John Stuart Mill, “instead of being one true and the other false, share the truth
between them” 30. Literature on echo chambers, by contrast, suggests that political diversity may
hamper productive cooperation as partisans perceive information held by opponents as not simply
different, but wrong. In short, political diversity should increase access to fresh perspectives and
information but may also undermine the quality of discourse and engagement required to enjoy the
performance benefits typically obtained by diverse groups.
In order to assess the effect of political diversity on team performance, we studied the effect
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of political polarization on the performance of approximately four hundred thousand online teams.
Specifically, we focused on teams or communities of Wikipedia editors who worked on English-
language articles in three large domains: Politics, Social Issues, and Science. We note that whether
online editors collaborating on a Wikipedia article should be considered a team or community is an
empirical question relating to the temporal and topical proximity of editor discussion and contri-
bution. For clarity, we use the term team to refer to all such editing collectives, and community to
characterize Wikipedia editors as a whole.
We observe a wide distribution of ideological alignments for Wikipedia editors (Figure 1 A).
The peak at the center of the distribution comports with our observation that a large number of
people only contributed minor edits to Wikipedia, such as correcting a typo. There are also two
lower but significant peaks at the tails of the distribution, which identify editors who contribute
substantial content to either liberal or conservative articles. The relative equality of these two
divided populations suggests substantial polarization on Wikipedia. The variance of alignments
across all editors of political articles is 0.04. This observed variance was significantly higher than
those obtained in random simulations that assume that editors allocate their effort at random with
ideological alignments of 0 (the bootstrap p-value for the observed variance 0.04 - the empirical
probability of observing a variance larger than 0.04 in 100 random simulations - is less than .001;
see Supplementary Methods 3 for details on simulations). We then measure the polarization of any
given group of editors by the variance of their alignment scores.
As the number of editors for an article increases, their average political alignment decreases
(Figure 2). This phenomenon is sometimes referred to as Linus’ law – “with enough eyeballs, all
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bugs are shallow”28. Articles attracting more attention tend to have more balanced engagement
from editors along the conservative-liberal spectrum. This finding replicates those reported by
Greenstein and Zhu 31, 32 in their studies of bias in Wikipedia’s US political coverage, showing that
increased editor interaction reduced individual biases and yielded greater content neutrality. But
this pattern raises a concern regarding the ideological alignment measure: if a popular political
article, whether liberal or conservative, attracts more balanced engagement from liberal and con-
servative editors, then it should contribute less information to our inferred ideological alignment
for those editors. We checked the robustness of our results after relaxing our dichotomous classi-
fication of Politics pages (see Supplementary Methods 2). Specifically, we adapted the Bayesian
framework described above to update the alignment of liberal and conservative pages as a function
of the balance of liberal and conservative editors who edit them. We recursively calculated the
alignment of editors based on this updated alignment of pages and found that this measure pro-
duced results qualitatively the same as those shown below for our simple dichotomous measure
(see Supplementary Table 3).
The 6-category quality scale for Wikipedia articles ranges from “Featured article” (highest
quality) to “Stub” (lowest quality). Figure 1 B plots the relationship between average team polar-
ization (i.e., variance of alignments) and quality for Political, Social Issues, and Science articles.
In all three corpora – Political, Social Issues, and Science articles – higher polarization is
associated with higher quality. To establish this relationship statistically, we estimated an ordinal
logistic regression model at the article level with article quality as outcome and polarization as main
independent variable. We controlled for the absolute value of average team alignment and article
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and editor features that may plausibly confound the relationship between polarization and quality.
These article features include length, number of edits, and number of editors for each article. We
specifically controlled for editors’ editing experience by adding the average number of previous
edits for each team.
As expected, number of edits, length of article, and number of editors significantly predict
article quality (see Table 1 for regression results). The coefficient for the |alignment| term suggests
that quality decreases when editors are biased, on average, in either direction. Most critical is that
polarization, the variance of political alignments, is positively and substantially associated with
quality: a 1-unit increase in polarization multiplies the odds of moving from lower- to higher-
quality categories by a factor of 18.57 for Political articles, 2.06 for Social Issues articles and 1.90
for Science articles.
To explore mechanisms by which ideologically polarized teams outperform homogeneous
teams, we examine Wikipedia ‘talk pages’. Each Wikipedia article has an associated talk page
where ‘backstage’ knowledge assemblage occurs. Here, editors debate proposed additions and
deletions, identify shortcomings, and attempt to persuade their fellow editors regarding content for
the public facing, ‘frontstage’, Wikipedia article 33. Using text from these talk pages, we examine
relationships between political polarization and the following aspects of debate: (1) debate inten-
sity, (2) information diversity, and (3) use of Wikipedia institutions—policies and guidelines—to
discipline discussion. We investigate pairwise correlations between polarization and these debate
mechanisms, then we estimate regression models to test the effect of polarization on these mech-
anisms separately, and finally, assemble them into a structural equation model that allows us to
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identify their relative influence on article quality. All statistical analyses yield consistent results re-
garding mechanisms of collaboration, as discussed below and detailed in the Supplementary Meth-
ods 6 and 7.
Studies of team diversity and performance argue that the diversity of information individuals
hold is the key driver of superior performance 5. Nevertheless, information diversity is almost never
measured directly, particularly in non-laboratory settings. The concept of information diversity
confounds the substance and form of information, which are independently critical in ideological
conflicts where interlocutors holding different beliefs frame the same issues in distinct language
with distinct meanings. To address this challenge, we decompose information diversity into two
measurable dimensions: lexical and semantic diversity. Semantic diversity captures distinct issues
discussed on a talk page, while lexical diversity captures the number of ways in which editors
discuss those issues. Because political polarization is predictably related to political content, we
expect that political polarization among Wikipedia editors will focus debate on the subset of polit-
ically relevant topics within their article, but frame those issues in diverse and conflicting ways. If
we are correct, greater political polarization among editors will yield lower semantic diversity and
higher lexical diversity on their talk pages. We measure the lexical diversity of each talk page as a
function of its distinct and distinguishing words. We measure the semantic diversity of a page as a
function of the dispersion of words on that page in a latent semantic space defined by all Wikipedia
articles, such that higher semantic diversity indicates more Wikipedia topics were debated. (See
Supplementary Methods 4 for details on the two diversity measures.) We find that high politi-
cal polarization narrows debate by reducing talk page semantic diversity but generates alternative
framings traced by greater lexical diversity, as illustrated in Figure 3.
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Diverse information should be more difficult to integrate, particularly if contested. We mea-
sure two core aspects of debate intensity including volume and temperature. Following previous
research that found talk page length associated with article quality 34, 35, we measure debate volume
as a function of talk page length and distinct edits. Polarized teams may attempt to integrate more
diverse information, requiring more talk, which yields greater article quality. Integrating diverse
perspectives on contested and value-laden topics could be acrimonious, but a balance of liber-
als and conservatives could lower the temperature of potentially volatile collaborations, following
research that links competitive imbalance to emotional aggression and violence 36. We measure
debate temperature using the Detox tool, developed by Wikimedia to identify harassment in the
Wiki community. Detox detects toxic comments using a sophisticated machine learning classifier
37, which we apply to all talk page edits. We find that polarized teams generate a larger volume of
debate (polarization’s coefficient β = 0.37, CI = [0.33, 0.40], z(86) = 20.20, p < .001, 2-sided
z-test, in the structural equation model discussed below and in Supplementary Methods 7) and their
balance of political perspectives reduces flare-ups in debate temperature (|alignment|’s coefficient
β = 0.08, CI = [0.04, 0.13], t(205737) = 3.67, p < .001, 2-sided t-test, in the linear regression
model that predicts debate temperature using |alignment|, polarization, numbers of editor and
edits, and page lengths).
Finally, we explore the self-governance of contested knowledge through use of Wikipedia
policies and guidelines. Policies and guidelines are invoked so frequently that they have a stan-
dard nomenclature (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wikipedia:Shortcut directory). For example, an
editor who believes that part of an article is biased may invoke “NPOV” (the “Neutral Point of
View” policy) in the article’s talk page. The “NPOV” policy requires claims made on Wikipedia
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to be free from editorial bias and inclusive of all significant views reported in reliable sources.
Wikipedia also relies on a collection of less binding guidelines that refer to desired qualities of
Wikipedia pages and the editorial process. These include that articles should cite sources (“CITE”)
and avoid and/or disclose any conflicts of interest (“COI”). We expect editors within polarized
teams to encounter differences not easily resolved and, when debate fails, to discipline or chal-
lenge collaborators by invoking Wikipedia’s policies and guidelines. Indeed, the numbers of
policy and guideline mentions are found to increase with polarization. When disaggregated, we
find that “NPOV” (Neutral point of view) and “OR” or “NOR” (No original research) are the
most frequently cited policies, and each significantly correlates with polarization (for “NPOV”,
Pearson ρ = 0.10, t(4671) = 6.87, p < .001, CI = [0.072, 0.128], and for “NOR,” Pearson
ρ = 0.08, t(6498) = 6.47, p < .001, CI = [0.056, 0.104], both for 2-sided t-tests).
Correlations between all modeled variables are presented in Supplementary Figure 3 and are
consistent with the regressions and structural equation model described below (also see Supple-
mentary Methods 6 and 7). We also note interesting associations between talk page measures,
suggesting micro-mechanisms of conflict and coordination, such as the negative correlation be-
tween debate temperature and talk page length (Pearson ρ=-0.08, n = 205744, p < .001 in 2-sided
t-tests). This is relevant to the growing literature about online “trolling” behavior 38, 39, suggest-
ing that interactional toxicity is associated with foreshortened debate and a decreased collective
capacity to construct quality Wikipedia pages.
We present results from a structural equation model in Figure 4, which allowed us to eval-
uate the combined impact of political polarization on article quality through mechanisms of col-
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laboration. We summarize the model estimates here. (See Supplementary Methods 7 for addi-
tional details.) The model is fitted to 205,744 pages. Compared with ideologically homogeneous
or skewed teams, polarized teams (1) debate fewer topics (β = −0.65, z(86) = −37.28, p <
.001, CI = [−0.68,−0.61], 2-sided z-test), (2) with more competing terminology and framings
(β = 0.20, z(86) =, p < .001, CI = [0.17, 0.23], 2-sided z-test). They engage in (3) more debate
(β = 0.37, z(86) = 20.20, p < .001, CI = [0.33, 0.40], 2-sided z-test), which is (4) less acri-
monious (β = −0.60, z(86) = −18.28, p < .001, CI = [−0.656,−0.53], 2-sided z-test). They
also (5) more frequently appeal to Wikipedia policies and guidelines to govern these interactions
(β = 0.20, z(86) = 8.20, p < .001, CI = [0.14, 0.24], 2-sided z-test).
Lastly, to assess whether editors’ ideological preferences measured on Wikipedia correspond
to their ideological preferences offline, we fielded two surveys, focusing on editors’ political party
affiliation and ideological self-identity (see Supplementary Discussion 1 for details). In both sur-
veys, approximately 45% of the contacted editors reported living in the U.S., and we report results
from their answers here. Our computational ideological alignment measure correlates moderately
well, and significantly predicts self-reported party affiliation on the democrat - republican spectrum
(Pearson ρ = 0.35, p = 0.035, n = 28; one-tailed permutation test, performed because the correla-
tion is predicted to be positive; AUC=0.71). Associations between computational and self-reported
ideology (on the liberal - conservative scale) are slightly weaker, with a Pearson correlation of
ρ = 0.25 (p = 0.06, n = 41 in a one-tailed permutation test) and a prediction AUC of 0.65. The
lower associations with self-identified ideology are not surprising, considering that self-identity
may be constructed in reference to one’s peers rather than being anchored along a global spectrum.
Moreover, the ideology survey was fielded after the inauguration of Donald Trump as President,
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which may have influenced individuals’ political self-identities or willingness to report them in
surveys. Finally, responses to this second survey were highly imbalanced, with 7 individuals self-
identifying as “extremely liberal” and 0 self-identifying as “extremely conservative.”
Taken together, the survey results provide some evidence that editing preferences measured
online are correlated with, and predictive of, party affiliations and ideological preferences offline.
Further research, including lab and field experiments, is necessary to establish these suggestive
relationships with causal certainty.
Mechanisms of polarized collaboration are echoed by editors in their survey responses. One
third of respondents indicated awareness of politically motivated conflicts, and two thirds of those
described them in detail. Conflicts typically entailed the encounter of biased content (e.g. “The
page read like anti-Russian propaganda”), or having one’s own content revised by editors per-
ceived as biased (e.g. “My neutral edits regarding a particular political group were moved lower
in the article to show negative opinions of this group first”). Many such conflicts were resolved
through debate. One respondent recalled a conflict over the meaning of the word “refugee”, which
was resolved “by legal arguments that would convince an impartial observer.” Another related an
intense conflict on a page about homosexuality, but admitted that as a result “the article is in a
better state.” Other conflicts were resolved through administrator intervention. One respondent
reported editing a page about a far-right politician that other editors would repeatedly vandalize;
administrators intervened and protected the page from further edits. Unbalanced political compe-
tition, however, where lone editors sought to de-bias articles maintained by politically like-minded
communities (e.g., with a perceived “right wing slant” or “anti-Russian bias”) led to more acrimo-
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nious conflict that often resulted in editor bans. Editing contested topics required toughness and
endurance, which was ameliorated by balanced conflict. It is precisely these engagements that are
missing from segregated “echo chamber” platforms, and which channel Wikipedia editors’ diverse
perspectives into articles of superior quality.
This study provides empirical, real-world evidence that ideological polarization can lead to
productive, high-quality collaboration. Wikipedia teams comprised by a balance of ideologically
polarized individuals perform better than groups comprised of political partisans and even moder-
ates. Positive effects from polarization are observed in Political, Social Issues, and even Science
articles. The intensified effect of ideological polarization on pages with greater political content
suggests that diversity is not universally beneficial, but assists when directly or indirectly relevant
to the topics considered. We demonstrate how frequent, intense disagreement within ideologically
polarized teams foments focused debate 40 and, as consequence, higher quality edits that are more
robust and comprehensive.
While our study revealed a statistically significant relationship between polarization and col-
laborative outcomes, we note several limitations of our analysis. First, our passive, computational
assessment of editors’ political alignments, on which our focal polarization measure relies, is fun-
damentally indirect. It captures political interest through engaged editorial participation, which
modestly predicts and correlates with both political party affiliation and self-described ideology. A
direct measure of political ideology or one containing greater signal of ideology and/or affiliation,
however, would tighten our inferences linking polarization to productive collaboration.
Second, although we have controlled statistically for many factors known to influence article
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quality in our models, confounding factors that we did not consider may remain. For example, most
contentious articles have been protected at some point and can only be edited by administrators or
senior editors during protection. It is possible that the effect of polarization we observed is driven
by this protection mechanism. We ruled out this possibility by controlling for protection status in
our models (see Supplementary Discussion 2 for details), but it is beyond our capacity to exhaust
all possible factors. We anticipate this to be an important area for future research.
Third, the observational nature of this study places constraints on interpreting the relation-
ship between ideological polarization and quality as a causal one. We observed only the behavior
of those editors who voluntarily cooperated with others of contrary politics to produce articles of
higher quality, or those who avoided such collaborations and produced lower quality articles. It is
possible that these are different kinds of people, and so we cannot rule out the possibility that ran-
domly assigned ideologically polarized teams may not outperform more homogeneous ones. Causal
identification of this relationship between Wikipedia’s design and productive collaboration will de-
mand laboratory and field experiments that enable both randomization and control. Nevertheless,
concerns of extreme self-selection on Wikipedia are allayed by its “encyclopedic monopoly”. As
the fifth most visited website in the world with more than 5 million articles on a wide range of
topics, Wikipedia represents an effective monopoly of reference attention. Efforts have been made
to produce politically skewed alternatives41, but no viable substitutes exist. More importantly,
Wikipedia contains only a single version of an article for a given topic. Consequently, if someone
wishes to influence public knowledge on topics such as “Climate change” or “Free market” through
Wikipedia, they must collaborate with existing editors who hold differing views but equal motiva-
tion. This is particularly salient for articles on contested topics, and frames a dramatic contrast with
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segregated “echo chambers” in the blogosphere. Previous research on Wikipedia also suggests that
cross-party collaboration is the norm rather than the exception 42.
Ideologically diverse collaborations are not without costs. One major obstacle to creating
well functioning, diverse teams is that such teams produce outputs that may appear worse to the
team members themselves 43. Membership in homogeneous teams also feels better as participation
affirms prior beliefs 44 and shelters contributors from aggressive interaction. Respondents to our
survey echoed this sentiment by reporting pervasive displeasure in having to convince obstinate,
competing partisans of points that they took to be self-evident. Balanced competition softened the
emotional edge of ideological conflict, however, by allowing members to police tone and content
with the omnipresent policies and norms of Wikipedia 45. Use of these named/acronymed norms
and policies was woven into the practice of Wikipedia conversation, signaled membership in the
overarching Wikipedia project, and likely helped compensate for a reduced vocabulary of norm
enforcement available in online, as opposed to face-to-face, interaction 46. Unlike many online
settings, when norms and policies break down, powerful moderators may step in and revert edits,
lock pages and execute bans, but it is the success and not the failure of Wikipedia norms that
predicts quality. Excluding the crowd by restricting pages to senior editor contributions had a
strong negative association with quality content (see Supplementary Discussion 2 for details).
Previous research suggests that very high levels of diversity in teams may deteriorate the
quality of teamwork. To explore whether political diversity has an upper bound beyond which po-
larization hampers performance, we re-estimated the regression models of quality with a quadratic
polarization term. A negative coefficient on the quadratic polarization term would suggest that
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very high polarization degrades article quality. We find that the coefficient is indeed negative
(β = −12.66, t(223151) = −11.64, p < .001, in a 2-sided t-test). Nevertheless, the polarization
level at which the association between polarization and quality becomes negative is very high, and
not realized by 95% of the teams in this study. Furthermore, a regression of quality on polarization
estimated on only the 5% most polarized teams shows no statistically significant pattern between
polarization and quality (β = 0.12, t(11152) = 0.23, p = .81, in a 2-sided t-test). In sum, we do
not find evidence that very high levels of political polarization hampers Wikipedia performance.
This study raises the possibility that in crowd-sourcing contested knowledge, the most mo-
tivated contributors are those with a biased perspective—an idiosyncratic take or angle on the dis-
agreement at hand. Conducting debates on platforms like Wikipedia can demand high levels of
motivation and patience. For example, the top editor of Hillary Clinton’s Wikipedia page estimated
spending 15 hours per week on protecting it from vandals (https://newrepublic.com/article/63288/wiki-
woman. Last accessed 2018-12-18). Neutral users lacking partisan motivation may choose to al-
locate their time elsewhere. It is plausible that for voluntary crowd-sourcing platforms there exists
an optimal, non-zero amount of user bias. Platforms that discourage all user bias may be inefficient
or unsustainable.
Insofar as ideological diversity can improve the quality of politically relevant crowd-sourced
knowledge, it is important to consider whether platforms should intervene to promote or even im-
pose such diversity where missing. Our work suggests that for contested knowledge, platforms
should seek not only high numbers of experts, but those with balanced, diverse perspectives to con-
struct an environment through which motivated conflicts can be disciplined by enforceable policies
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and guidelines. Just as institutional designs to promote gender diversity have proven valuable for
fairness and performance in a variety of domains 47–49, designing for political diversity may be-
come an increasingly important priority. Our study suggests that designing for political diversity
may allow the digital age to grapple with John Stuart Mill’s admonition that “not the violent con-
flict between parts of the truth, but the quiet suppression of half of it, is the formidable evil; there
is always hope when people are forced to listen to both sides...”30.
Methods
Overview. Using edit histories, we measured the online political preferences - ideological align-
ment - of 605,359 Wikipedia editors by the relative quantity of content they contributed to con-
servative versus liberal political articles. In addition, two surveys were conducted with n=500 and
n=327 random samples of Wikipedia editors for whom we had calculated the index. We then used a
machine learning algorithm developed by Wikimedia’s internal researchers to measure the quality
of Wikipedia articles 50 and related article quality to the political diversity of teams. Finally, we
sought insight regarding mechanisms of collaboration among polarized teams by computationally
exploring characteristics of article “talk pages” where the work of editing, debate and persuasion
occurs.
Data collection. We extracted data from the complete English Wikipedia database dump
on 12/01/2016. Data includes all edits made to all English Wikipedia articles since its start until
12/01/2016. Within this dump, we focused on three sets of articles: politics (20,947 articles),
social issues (162,085 articles) and science (49,530 articles), which represent approximately 5%
16
of all English Wikipedia articles. Summary statistics of the three corpora may be found in the
Supplementary Table 1. Users’ total numbers of edits ever made to Wikipedia were collected
through Wikipedia’s online API (http://en.wikipedia.org/w/api.php).
The corpus of Political articles consists of two sub-corpora, Liberal and Conservative arti-
cles. The Liberal sub-corpus consists of all articles categorized under the “Liberalism in the United
States” category (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Category:Liberalism in the United States. Last ac-
cessed 2018-12-18.) and its subcategories. For instance, the article “New Deal coalition” is directly
under the root category, while “The New Republic” is located under the sub-category “Liberal-
ism in the United States > Modern liberal American magazines”. The Conservative sub-corpus
was collected in a similar fashion starting with the “ Conservatism in the United States” category
(https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Category:Conservatism in the United States. Last accessed 2018-
12-18). For instance, “Conservatism in the United States” links to “Economic liberalism,” which
links to “Market economy,” and all three articles are in the “Conservative” sub-corpus. 406 articles
(approximately 4%) appear in both corpora and were removed.
Titles of Social Issues articles were collected starting from the page “Category:Social issues”
(https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Category:Social issues. Last accessed 2018-12-18). We collected
all articles and subcategories linked from the page; repeating this process in every subcategory of
Social Issues, stopping 4 levels down from the root. Social Issues include articles relating to human
welfare and justice, including “Homelessness,” “Teenage pregnancy,” and “Social services.” These
articles tend to be relatively controversial and politically salient. Titles of science articles were col-
lected similarly, following the category structure of scientific disciplines in Wikipedia, starting from
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the page “Category:Scientific disciplines” (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Category:Scientific disciplines.
Last accessed 2018-12-18) and following the iterative procedure pursued for Social Issues articles.
Measurement of article quality. We measured the quality of Wikipedia articles algorithmi-
cally using a prominent approach that draws on features derived from article content alone and not
information about editors or their collaboration patterns 51. Wikipedia editors have scored hundreds
of articles on quality, but human-generated ratings for most of Wikipedia’s millions of articles do
not exist and necessitate an algorithmic approach. In particular, we used the wikiclass algo-
rithm, developed by Wikimedia research staff 50 and trained on Wikipedia articles scored by active
editors for quality using a six-class scale, which ranges from “Featured Article” (highest quality)
to “Stub” (lowest quality). The wikiclass algorithm predicts the correct quality class in 62.9%
of cases and is off by at most one quality class in 90.7% of cases 50.
Measurement of ideological preferences. We measure editors’ online ideological prefer-
ences – alignments – by the fraction of bytes they choose to contribute to “Conservative” (red)
versus “Liberal” (blue) articles on the English-language Wikipedia, with a Bayesian framework
to account for limited or random edits. The corpus of conservative articles consists of all articles
categorized under “Conservatism in the United States,” and similarly for “Liberalism in the United
States.” (See Data collection above.) This procedure scores editors as ideologically neutral (≈ 0) if
they contribute equally to both sets of articles or little to either set, and closer to -1 or +1 the more
exclusively they contribute to liberal or conservative articles, respectively.
Specifically, we model the total bytes an editor contributed to red articles (X) as a random
variable satisfying a binomial distribution X ∼ Binomial(K, p), where K is the total number of
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bytes contributed to political articles (red or blue) and p is the probability of contributing to red
articles. This probability p represents our measure of ideological alignment for the editor, after
rescaling it to the range -1 (most liberal) to +1 (most conservative). The parameter p is an unknown
quantity to be estimated from observations X and K. We estimated it through a conservative,
Bayesian framework described in Supplementary Methods 1.
The quantity of primary interest is the variance of alignments among a group of editors, which
quantifies the spread of editors across the liberal-conservative spectrum. We used the variance
in ideological alignments as a measure of polarization for any group of editors editing the same
Wikipedia page. Previous research has found that this measure most directly captures the cognitive
diversity of a group along a particular demographic dimension 52.
Surveys of editors. To assess the extent to which our measure of online ideological prefer-
ences corresponds to individuals’ offline preferences and self-identities, we conducted two surveys
on n=500 and n=327 random samples from the set of editors for whom we had estimated align-
ment scores. The first survey focused on political party affiliation, while the second focused on
ideological self-identity. Both surveys allow us to explore the mechanisms of collaborations within
polarized groups by asking editors about relevant editing experiences. We worked directly with
the Wikipedia community and Wikimedia staff to carry out the surveys, including the development
of a research page on the Wikimedia “Meta-Wiki” site and direct engagement with those express-
ing concerns therein (https://meta.wikimedia.org/wiki/Research:Wikipedia %2B Politics. Last ac-
cessed 2018-12-18). The arrived-upon process required a single member of our team (E.D.) to
personally post the survey link on each of the randomly selected editors’ pages along with an ex-
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planation. The number of solicitations we could make per day (and the total number) was capped.
In the end, we were able to post 500 solicitations for the first survey and received 118 responses.
For the second survey, we posted 327 solicitations and received 100 responses. We did not record
any demographic data on our respondents beyond whether their residence was inside or outside
of the U.S. Participants were shown a consent script prior to any questions. All questions on the
survey were optional. The surveys’ methods were approved by the University of Chicago’s Institu-
tional Review Board (IRB17-0679). More information may be found in Supplementary Discussion
1.
Data availability. Data used in the study are available at https://github.com/KnowledgeLab/wisdom-
of-polarized-crowds.
Code availability. Code used to gather, process and analyze the data is available at https://github.com/KnowledgeLab/wisdom-
of-polarized-crowds.
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Table 1: Odds ratios from ordinal logistic regression models predicting article quality. Sta-
tistical significance levels (p-values) are derived from 2-sided Wald tests. The columns
present odds ratios estimated on Political, Social issues and Science articles, separately.
Dependent variable: article quality
Independent variable Politics p Social issues p Science p
polarization 18.88 < .001 2.06 < .001 1.79 .006
| alignment | 0.30 < .001 0.49 < .001 0.65 .002
editing experience 1.05 0.02 1.06 < .001 1.01 0.30
number of editors 0.41 < .001 0.51 < .001 0.56 < .001
article length 33.55 < .001 47.83 < .001 56.54 < .001
number of edits 3.26 < .001 1.71 < .001 1.69 < .001
N 12,570 161,070 49,995
28
A B
Figure 1: A. Distribution of editors’ computationally measured ideological alignments, ranging
from -1 (most liberal, where editors make intensive and exclusive contributions to liberal articles)
to 1 (most conservative, where editors make intensive and exclusive contributions to conserva-
tive articles). B. Average polarization score of teams in each article quality level (Stub=lowest,
FA=highest) for Politics (purple), Social Issues (orange) and Science (green) articles. Bands around
each mean denote its 95% confidence interval. The actual numbers for the means and their CI’s are
included in Supplementary Table 3.
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Figure 2: Scatter plot with each article’s average editor alignment by number of editors. Average
political alignment shrinks as number of editors increases, demonstrating the Linus Effect. His-
tograms on x and y axes reveal the density of articles at each level of editorial attention and average
political alignment, respectively. Call-out boxes list five of the most “liberal” and “conservative”
pages for articles receiving the most and least editorial attention, featuring article titles followed
by an optional description, mean political alignment, number of editors, and article length in bytes.
These examples illustrate meaningful association between the political preferences of right and left-
learning Wikipedia editors and the pages they edit (e.g., “capitalism” and “history” vs. “planet”
and “human evolution”).
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Figure 3: Illustration of the shift in “talk page” debate activity between teams in the bottom and top
thirds of the political polarization distribution. Compared with the least polarized third of teams
(green), the most polarized third (purple) semantically contract by 5.6% and lexically expand by
23.4%: they talk more about less, focusing on core politically-contested subjects, but framing them
in distinctive ways.
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Figure 4: Estimated structural equation model linking political polarization (top left) with article
quality (bottom right) through talk page debate intensity, information diversity and use of Wikipedia
policies and guidelines. The model includes control variables associated with features of the arti-
cles themselves. Rectangles represent measured variables and ovals indicate latent variables. All
coefficients are significant at the p < .0001 level, agreeing with individual models and bivariate
correlations. See Supplementary Methods 7 for more details about the model and results.
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